-£t   \  :  fe-    * 


^n-^^^ 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION. 


REPORT  OF  THE  CHIEF  INSPECTOR  OF  SAFETY  APPLI- 
ANCES, COVERING  HIS  INVESTIGATION  OF  AN 
ACCIDENT  WHICH  OCCURRED  ON  THE  CENTRAL 
VERMONT  RAILWAY,  NEAR  GEORGIA.  VT.,  ON  NOVEM- 
BER 16,  1913. 


January  12,  1914. 
To  the  Commission: 

On  November  16,  1913,  there  was  a  head-end  collision  between  two 
freight  trains  on  the  Central  Vermont  Railway  near  Georgia,  Vt., 
which  resulted  in  the  death  of  one  fireman  and  one  trespasser,  and 
the  injury  of  two  employees.  After  investigation  as  to  the  nature 
and  cause  of  this  accident,  I  beg  to  submit  the  following  report: 

On  the  date  of  the  accident  southbound  extra  777,  consisting  of  23 
cars  and  a  caboose,  hauled  by  locomotive  No.  777,  in  charge  of  Con- 
ductor Muzzy  and  Engineman  Randall,  left  St.  Albans,  Vt..  at  11.50 
a.  m.,  Avith  train  order  No.  104,  reading  as  follows: 

Eng.  777  run  extra  St.  Albans  to  Essex  Junction,  take  siding,  and  meet  4 
extras,  410,  413,  411.  and  408  north  at  Georgia. 

Extra  777  passed  Oakland,  the  first  station  north  of  Georgia  and 
4.4  miles  distant  therefrom,  at  12.16  p.  m..  and  had  reached  a  point 
about  2|  miles  north  of  Georgia  when  it  collided  with  extra  410,  the 
collision  occurring  at  about  12.20  p.  m. 

Northbound  extra  410,  consisting  of  27  cars  and  a  caboose,  hauled 
by  locomotive  No.  410,  in  charge  of  Conductor  Holland  and  Engine- 
man  Brown,  left  Essex  Junction  with  an  order  giving  it  the  right 
to  run  from  Essex  Junction  to  St.  Albans  and  to  meet  southbound 
extra  768  at  Colchester,  a  station  10.5  miles  south  of  Georgia.  While 
at  Colchester  the  crew  in  charge  of  extra  410  received  a  copy  of  train 
order  No.  104,  quoted  above.  Engineman  Brown  received  his 
copy  of  this  order  as  the  train  was  pulling  out  of  the  siding,  and 
in  some  manner  read  the  meeting  point  named  in  the  order  as  "  Oak- 
land "  instead  of  "  Georgia."  The  fireman,  head  brakeman.  and 
flagman  did  not  read  the  order,  while  the  conductor  claimed  that  he 
did  not  receive  a  copy  of  it,  and  as  no  middle  order  was  issued  at 
Georgia  the  train-order  board  at  that  point  was  in  the  clear  position 

27439—14 


2  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 

when  extra  410  approached,  and  Engineman  Brown  ran  his  train 
past  that  station  with  the  intention  of  meeting  extra  777  at  Oakland. 
The  speed  of  each  train  at  the  time  of  the  collision  was  believed  to 
have  been  about  25  miles  an  hour.     The  weather  was  clear. 

Both  engines  were  badly  damaged  and  14  freight  cars  were  either 
totally  or  partially  destroyed,  while  considerable  damage  was  done 
to  the  track. 

The  northern  division  of  the  Central  Vermont  Railway,  on  which 
this  accident  occurred,  is  a  single-track  line.  At  the  time  of  this 
accident  trains  were  operated  by  train  orders  and  time-card  rights 
without  block  signals,  orders  being  transmitted  by  telephone,  with  the 
telegraph  as  an  auxiliary  for  use  in  case  of  emergency.  The  collision 
occurred  on  a  1°  10'  curve,  2,416  feet  in  length,  at  a  point  about  1,000 
feet  south  of  its  northern  end.  Approaching  this  curve  from  the 
north  there  is  a  tangent  about  2,000  feet  in  length,  and  approaching 
from  the  south  there  is  about  1,900  feet  of  tangent. 

Rule  No.  208  of  the  operating  rules  of  the  Central  Vermont  Rail- 
way provides  in  part  as  follows : 

A  train  order  to  be  sent  to  two  or  more  offices  must  l><>  transmitted  simul- 
taneously to  as  many  of  them  as  practicable. 

The  several  addresses  must  be  in  the  order  of  superiority  of  trains,  and  when 
practicable,  must  include  the  operator  «t  the  meeting  or  waiting  point,  each 
office  taking  its  proper  address. 

When  not  sent  simultaneously  to  all,  the  order  must  be  sent  first  to  the 
operator  at  the  meeting  or  waiting  point  and  then  to  trains  in  the  order  of  their 
superiority. 

.  There  was  an  open  telegraph  office  at  Georgia  equipped  with  all 
the  necessary  facilities  which  would  make  it  practicable  to  furnish 
the  agent,  who  handled  orders  at  that  point,  with  a  copy  of  train 
order  No.  104.  Although  there  was  no  question  but  what  it  would 
have  been  practicable  to  have  issued  a  middle  order  at  Georgia,  Dis- 
patcher Stevens  stated  that  he  did  not  do  so  because  the  middle  order 
was  never  used  unless  passenger  trains  were  involved.  No  instruc- 
tions that  this  was  the  manner  in  which  rule  No.  208  was  to  be  obeyed 
had  ever  been  given  to  him  by  the  superintendent  or  trainmaster. 
,  Superintendent  Keefe  stated  that  he  had  full  knowledge  thai 
middle  orders  were  not  being  issued  when  first-class  trains  were  not 
involved.  His  predecessor  had  ruled  that  the  requirement  was  not 
to  be  followed,  and  the  custom  had  therefore  been  continued.  He 
considered  that  the  use  of  the  middle  order  would  increase  safety 
in  train  operation,  that  it  would  be  practicable,  and  he  presumed 
that  it  would  be  advisable  to  adopt  the  rule  requiring  its  use. 

Trainmaster  Fitzgerald  stated  that  at  the  time  the  present  book 
of  rules  went  into  effect,  June  18,  1911,  he  was  given  to  understand 
that  the  middle  order  would  not  be  used  in  the  case  of  freight  trains. 
He  did  not  see  any  circular  issued  relative  to  the  matter  and  did 


ACCIDENT    ON   CENTRAL   VERMONT   BY.    NEAR   GEORGIA,   VT.  3 

not  remember  where  he  secured  his  information,  unless  it  was  when 
he  was  writing  up  the  book  of  rules. 

Under  date  of  November  1,  1913,  Circular  No.  28,  calling  attention 
to  the  fact  that  certain  operating  rules  were  not  being  obeyed,  was 
issued  over  the  signature  of  General  Superintendent  of  Transporta- 
tion Russell.    This  circular  rend  in  full  as  follows: 

'in   AGENTS,   OPERATORS,  CONDUCTORS.   ENGINEERS,   BRAKEMEN,   AND   FIREMEN. 

The  following  is  an  extract  from  rule  210,  page  3<>.  Book  of  Rules  and 
Regulations,  relating  to  '"31  "  orders: 

"The  conductor  of  the  train  addressed  will  read  the  order  aloud  to  the  oper- 
ator and  sign  it.'  The  operator  will  then  send  the  signature,  preceded  by  the 
number  of  (he  order,  to  the  train  dispatcher.  The  response,  'Complete,'  and 
the  time,  with  the  initials  of  the  superintendent  or  trainmaster,  will  then  be 
given  by  the  train  dispatcher.  After  receiving  this  response,  the  operator  will 
write  on  each  copy  the  word  '  Complete,'  the  time,  and  his  last  name  in  full,  and 
deliver  a  ropy  to  each  person  addressed,  except  engineers.  The  copy  for  each 
engineer  must  be  delivered  to  him  personally  by  the  conductor,  who  will  require 
the  order  to  be  read  aloud  for  comparison,  and  engineer  will  then  sign  con- 
ductor's copy." 

Rule  204.  page  34,  makes  it  incumbent  on  conductors  and  engineers  to  require 
brakemen  and  firemen  to  know  the  contents  of  all  train  orders. 

Investigation  develops  that  some  operators  are  delivering  orders  to  brakemen 
and  firemen,  the  latter  are  accepting  them,  and  conductors  and  engineers  are 
permitting  it  to  be  done:  also  when  light  engines  are  run  over  the  road  and 
accompanied  by  a  flagman,  not  a  qualified  conductor,  it  has  occurred  that  the 
operator  has  permitted  the  flagman  to  sign  for  the  engineer  and  the  latter  has 
accepted  the  order  without  question. 

Conductors  and  engineers,  for  the  protection  of  yourselves  and  crew,  also 
passengers  and  property  intrusted  to  your  care,  you  are  forbidden  to  allow 
this. 

Hereafter  an  operator  who  permits  anyone  to  sign  an  order  other  than 
the  conductor  of  the  train,  engineer  of  light  engine,  or  qualified  conductor 
pilot,  a  conductor  who  allows  the  brakeman  or  fireman  to  do  so,  or  an  engineer 
who  accepts  order  from  anyone  other  than  the  conductor,  (except  in  case  of 
light  engine  without  qualified  conductor  pilot),  as  well  as  the  brakeman  or 
fireman  involved,  will  be  dismissed  from  the  service,  and  this  warning  is  given 
with  the  desire  that  employees  concerned  may  heed  it  and  avoid  necessity  for 
such  action. 

Agent  Boyce,  located  at  Colchester,  stated  that  extra  410  arrived 
at  that  point  at  11.05  a.  m.  Some  time  after  its  arrival  he  was  noti- 
fied by  the  dispatcher  that  the  latter  had  an  order  for  extra  410,  as 
well  as  three  other  extras  which  were  following  that  train.  The 
statements  of  Agent  Boyce  as  to  what  he  did  immediately  afterwards 
were  conflicting.  He  first  stated  that  he  went  out  to  the  station  plat- 
form and  told  a  man  sitting  there  that  he  had  an  order  for  him;  that 
the  man  had  been  sitting  there  ever  since  extra  410  arrived,  and  that 
he  assumed  him  to  be  the  conductor  of  that  train.  Agent  Boyce 
afterwards  stated  that  he  first  asked  the  man  if  he  was  the  conductor 
of  extra  410  and  that  the  man  replied  in  the  affirmative.     Tn  any 


4  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 

event  he  stated  that  the  man  came  into  the  office  while  he  was  repeat- 
ing the  order  back  to  the  dispatcher,  and  as  soon  as  he  had  finished 
repeating  the  order  he  handed  two  copies  of  it  to  this  man,  who 
had  signed  the  name  "  Holland,"  procured  a  clearance,  and  departed. 
Agent  Boyce  did  not  put  the  train-order  board  in  the  stop  position 
as  soon  as  he  was  notified  by  the  dispatcher  that  there  was  an  order 
for  the  northbound  extras  because  southbound  extra  768  was  then 
approaching  and  he  did  not  want  to  stop  that  train.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  however,  he  did  display  the  train-order  board  before  extra  708 
had  entirely  passed  the  station.  It  was  seen  by  the  conductor  and 
flagman  of  that  train,  and  when  their  train  came  to  a  stop  at  11.45 
a.  m.  on  account  of  the  switch  at  the  south  end  of  the  passing  track 
being  blocked  the  conductor  went  into  the  office  to  sign  the  order  he 
supposed  was  to  be  issued  for  his  train.  He  was  then  told  by  the 
agent  that  the  latter  did  not  intend  to  display  the  signal  until  extra 
768  had  passed,  as  the  order  was  for  the  northbound  extras,  and  was 
given  a  clearance  card.  Agent  Boyce  further  stated  that  he  did  not 
read  the  order  to  the  man  he  supposed  to  be  the  conductor  of  extra 
410,  as  the  latter  was  in  the  office  while  he  was  repeating  the  order 
back  to  the  dispatcher  and  must  have  heard  its  contents  at  that  time. 
The  man  did  not  read  the  order  back  to  him,  as  required  by  the 
rules,  neither  did  he  ask  him  to  do  so.  Agent  Boyce  further  stated 
that  extra  410  wTas  pulling  by  the  station  at  this  time;  that  the  train- 
order  board  was  still  displayed ;  that  he  did  not  come  out  of  the 
office  to  close  the  passing-track  switch  after  it  had  left;  and  that  at 
no  time  while  extra  410  was  standing  at  the  station  did  Conductor 
Holland  come  to  the  office. 

Conductor  Holland,  of  extra  410,  stated  that  on  the  arrival  of  his 
train  at  Colchester,  Flagman  Bronson  went  forward  and  he  told  the 
flagman  to  have  the  engineman  signal  him  by  means  of  the  Avhistle 
if  the  train-order  board  was  displayed.  This  signal  was  not  given 
and  he  supposed  that  there  were  no  orders  for  his  train.  Leaving 
Colchester  he  was  on  the  rear  of  the  caboose  on  the  side  nearest  the 
station,  at  which  time  the  train-order  board  was  in  the  proceed  posi- 
tion. When  the  flagman  got  on  the  caboose  as  it  was  passing  the 
station  he  did  not  give  the  conductor  a  copy  of  train  order  No.  104, 
and  did  not  say  that  he  had  signed  or  received  any  orders.  Con- 
ductor Holland  asked  the  flagman  for  orders,  and  the  flagman  re- 
plied asking  the  conductor  to  let  him  see  an  order  which  they  had 
received  at  a  previous  station.  Flagman  Bronson  then  left  him  and 
went  into  the  cupola  of  the  caboose,  having  made  no  direct  response 
to  the  conductor's  inquiry  about  orders.  Conductor  Holland  further 
stated  that  sometimes  the  brakemen  and  sometimes  the  operators 
signed  orders,  and  that  often  he  would  receive  an  order  without 
knowing  who  had  signed  it,  although  occasionally  he  would  ask  who 


ACCIDENT    ON    CENTRAL    VERMONT    KV.    NEAR    GEORGIA,    VT.  5 

signed  it.  When  circular  No.  28  was  issued  he  told  his  brakemen 
about  it  and  had  impressed  upon  them  that  they  were  not  to  sign  any 
more  orders. 

Flagman  Bronson,  of  extra  410,  stated  that  when  the  train  stopped 
at  Colchester  he  went  forward  to  look  it  over  and  then  went  to  the 
engine  and  remained  there  until  the  train-order  board  was  displayed. 
He  could  not  remember  whether  or  not  the  head  brakeman  had  said 
that  there  was  an  order  for  their  train,  and  stated  that  before  he  left 
the  caboose  the  conductor  said  nothing  to  him  about  having  the  en- 
gineman  signal  him  by  means  of  the  whistle  if  there  was  an  order 
for  his  train..  When  the  train-order  board  was  displayed  the  train 
was  about  ready  to  start  and  he  at  once  went  to  the  telegraph  office, 
at  which  time  the  agent  was  repeating  the  order  back  to  the  dis- 
patcher. The  dispatcher  evidently  said  something  to  the  agent  about 
Conductor  Holland,  as  the  agent  replied  that  Holland  was  right 
there.  On  account  of  the  train  being  ready  to  leave  and  several 
extras  being  immediately  behind  it  Flagman  Bronson  was  in  a 
hurry,  and  as  the  conductor  was  not  around  he  signed  the  order  as 
soon  as  the  agent  had  finished  repeating  it,  took  two  copies  of  it. 
together  with  the  clearance,  and  started  out  of  the  door.  When  he 
signed  the  order  the  agent  did  not  ask  him  if  he  was  Conductor  Hol- 
land and  did  not  read  the  order  to  him,  neither  did  he  read  it  back 
to  the  agent.  Wlien  he  left  the  station  his  train  was  already  under 
way  and  he  signaled  the  engineinan  to  slow  down  and  gave  him  a 
copy  of  the  order,  not  waiting  to  have  the  engineinan  read  it  to  him 
or  to  read  it  himself:  neither  did  he  stop  to  have  the  engineinan  sign 
the  conductor's  copy.  He  further  stated  that  he  might  have  told 
the  engineman  that  the  meeting  point  was  Oakland,  but  was  not  posi- 
tive about  it.  When  the  caboose  came  along,  at  which  time  the  train- 
order  board  was  still  displayed,  he  got  on  the  rear  steps.  The  con- 
ductor then  asked  him  what  he  had  and  he  handed  the  other  copy  of 
the  order  to  him,  together  with  the  clearance  card.  The  agent  had 
previously  told  him  that  he  would  attend  to  the  switch,  and  after 
giving  the  order  to  the  conductor  he  did  not  stop  to  read  it  over  with 
him,  but  went  up  into  the  cupola  and  as  soon  as  the  agent  gave  him 
a  signal  that  the  switch  was  closed  he  signaled  the  engineman 
and  the  train  proceeded  on  its  way.  During  this  time  Conductor 
Holland  was  on  the  rear  steps  of  the  caboose  and  if  he  had  not 
received  a  train  order  or  a  clearance  card,  or  both,  should  have 
stopped  the  train,  in  as  much  as  the  train-order  board  was  dis- 
played. At  some  point  between  Colchester  and  Georgia  he  asked  the 
conductor  for  the  order  and  the  latter  replied  that  he  did  not  have  it, 
and  the  only  knowledge  Flagman  Bronson  had  of  the  meeting  point 
named  in  the  order  was  his  understanding  that  the  operator  had  said 
Oakland.     He   stated   that   he   occasionally   signed    orders   for  con- 


6  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 

ductors  in  order  to  avoid  delays,  that  Conductor  Holland  had  never 
approved  or  disapproved  of  this  practice,  and  that  for  years  he  had 
frequently  signed  orders  for  Conductor  Holland. 

Head  Brakeman  McCarthy  of  extra  410  stated  that  when  the  train 
reached  Colchester  he  opened  the  passing-track  switch  and  then  got 
on  the  train  at  about  the  third  or  fourth  car  from  the  head  end. 
When  it  came  to  a  stop  he  got  down,  walked  back  a  few  car  lengths, 
and  then  went  to  the  station  platform  and  sat  down.  After  a  while 
the  agent  came  out  and  asked  him  if  he  was  the  conductor  of  extra 
410.  He  replied  that  he  was  not,  but  that  he  would  get  the  conductor, 
the  agent  saying  he  had  an  order,  Form  31,  for  that  train.  Brakeman 
McCarthy  then  went  to  the  engine  and  asked  the  engineman  to  call 
the  conductor  for  orders.  The  latter  did  not  do  so,  however,  but 
Flagman  Bronson,  who  was  on  the  engine,  at  once  got  off  and  went 
toward  the  telegraph  office.  When  the  train  was  ready  to  leave, 
Brakeman  McCarthy  opened  the  main-line  switch  and  got  on  the 
train  when  about  two  or  three  cars  had  passed  the  switch.  After 
receiving  the  all-right  signal  from  the  rear  end  of  the  train  he  went 
forward  to  the  engine.  He  heard  the  engineman  state  that  the  meet- 
ing point  in  the  order  was  Oakland,  but  did  not  read  the  order  him- 
self and  did  not  ask  the  engineman  to  permit  him  to  read  it. 

Engineman  Brown  of  extra  410  stated  he  first  saw  extra  777  when 
about  10  car  lengths  distant.  He  at  once  shut  off  steam,  applied  the 
emergency  brakes,  called  to  the  fireman  to  jump,  and  did  so  himself. 
On  account  of  receiving  a  train  order  and  clearance  card  he  stated 
that  he  might  have  overlooked  the  train-order  board  when  leaving 
Colchester,  and  for  that  reason  was  unable  to  state  whether  or  not  it 
was  displayed  at  that  time.  When  Flagman  Bronson  handed  the 
order  to  him,  at  which  time  the  train  was  proceeding  slowly,  he  un- 
derstood the  flagman  to  say  that  they  would  meet  at  Oakland.  He 
read  over  the  order  and  misread  the  meeting  point,  reading  it  as 
Oakland  instead  of  Georgia.  After  reading  the  order  he  held  it  out 
toward  the  fireman,  but  the  latter  was  working  on  the  fire  and  did 
not  take  it,  saying  that  it  was  all  right,  and  in  as  much  as  the  head 
brakeman  was  not  on  the  engine  the  result  was  that  no  one  on  the 
head  end  of  the  train  was  correctly  informed  as  to  the  meeting  point 
on  account  of  the  engineman  having  misread  the  order.  Engineman 
Brown  further  stated  that  it  frequently  happened  that  he  would 
accept  train  orders  from  brakemen,  and  sometimes  without  signing 
a  copy  for  the  conductor;  neither  did  he  always  read  the  order  aloud 
to  the  conductor  or  to  the  person  from  whom  he  received  it.  It  had 
formerly  been  quite  customary  for  brakemen  to  sign  orders  for  con- 
ductors, but  lately  this  practice  was  supposed  to  have  been  done  away 
with;  it  had  not.  however,  been  discontinued  entirely.  lie  could  not 
say  positively  whether  or  not  Flagman  Bronson  had  ever  delivered 


ACCIDENT   ON   CENTRAL   VERMONT    RY.    NEAR   GEORGIA,    VT.  7 

train  orders  to  him  on  previous  occasions,  but  thought  it  possible 
that  lie  had.  He  stated,  however,  that  on  several  occasions  when 
Conductor  Holland  had  been  the  conductor  of  his  train  he  had  re- 
ceived train  orders  when  they  had  not  been  signed  by  the  conductor. 

Conductor  Engham  and  Flagman  McConnell,  of  southbound  extra 
768,  stated  that  when  the  engine  of  their  train  passed  the  station 
the  train-order  board  was  not  displayed,  but  that  it  was  displayed 
when  all  but  four  or  five  cars  of  their  train  had  passed.  Soon  after 
extra  768  came  to  a  stop  extra  410  departed,  Conductor  Holland 
being  seen  standing  on  the  rear  platform  of  the  caboose.  At  that 
time  the  train-order  board  was  displayed,  as  it  had  been  ever  since 
extra  768  arrived. 

The  engineman,  fireman,  and  head  brakeman  of  extra  777  did  not 
see  extra  410  approaching  around  the  curve  until  the  trains  were  but 
a  few  car  lengths  away.  They  at  once  jumped  from  the  engine,  the 
emergency  air  brakes  first  having  been  applied. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  statements  made  by  the  employees  con- 
cerning many  of  the  important  details  connected  with  this  accident 
are  very  conflicting.  It  is  believed,  howTever,  that  when  Agent  Boyce 
was  notified  by  the  dispatcher  that  there  was  an  order  for  extra  410 
he  went  out  of  the  office  and  asked  the  man  sitting  there,  who  was 
Brakeman  McCarthy,  if  he  was  the  conductor,  saying  that  he  had 
an  order,  Form  31,  for  his  train.  Brakeman  McCarthy  then  went 
to  the  engine  with  the  intention  of  having  the  engineman  summon 
the  conductor  for  the  purpose  of  having  him  sign  the  order.  En- 
gineman Brown,  however,  did  not  summon  the  conductor,  but  Flag- 
man Bronson  left  the  engine,  went  to  the  telegraph  office,  and  signed 
the  order.  Flagman  Bronson  then  returned  to  the  engine,  gave  the 
engineman  his  copy,  and  got  on  the  caboose  when  it  came  along. 
The  question  of  whether  or  not  Flagman  Bronson  gave  Conductor 
Holland  a  copy  of  the  order  is  a  matter  of  veracity  between  the  tw7o 
men.  The  statements  made  by  other  employees,  however,  especially 
the  conductor  and  flagman  of  extra  768.  indicate  that  Conductor 
Holland  was  on  the  rear  end  of  his  caboose  when  the  train  departed 
from  Colchester  and  that  the  train-order  board  was  displayed  at 
that  time.  If  he  had  not  received  an  order,  as  well  as  a  clearance 
card.  Conductor  Holland  was  disobeying  the  rules  in  allowing  his 
train  to  pass  this  train-order  board  without  having  a  clearance  card. 

The  direct  cause  of  this  accident  was  the  failure  of  Conductor 
Holland  and  Engineman  Brown  to  comply  with  the  older  fixing 
Georgia  as  the  meeting  point  of  these  trains. 

If  Conductor  Holland  received  a  copy  of  the  order,  then  he  allowed 
his  train  to  pass  the  meeting  point  named  therein,  while  if  he  did  not 
receive  a  copy  of  it  he  should  not  have  allowed  his  train  to  leave 
Colchester  when  the  train-order  board  was  displayed  in  the  stop  po- 


8  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

sition  unless  furnished  personally  by  the  agent  with  a  clearance  card, 
Form  A,  even  though  train  orders  might  have  been  received  by  him. 
Conductor  Holland  also  failed  to  comply  with  any  of  the  require- 
ments of  that  part  of  rule  No.  210  quoted  in  circular  No.  28,  ignored 
that  part  of  Circular  No.  28  prohibiting  the  signing  of  orders  by 
brakemen,  disobeyed  that  part  of  rule  No.  204  requiring  that  con- 
ductors know  that  brakemen  are  familiar  with  the  contents  of  all 
orders,  and  failed  personally  to  deliver  a  copy  of  the  order  to  the 
engineman  and  to  require  the  engineman  to  read  the  same  and  then 
sign  the  conductor's  copy. 

Engineman  Brown  also  violated  rule  No.  204  by  not  requiring  the 
fireman  and  head  brakeman  to  be  fully  acquainted  with  the  contents 
of  train  order  No.  104;  violated  rule  No.  210  and  Circular  No.  28 
by  net  reading  the  order  aloud  for  comparison  when  he  received  it, 
by  not  signing  the  conductor's  copy,  and  by  accepting  the  order  from 
a  brakeman  instead  of  the  conductor. 

There  were,  however,  several  other  causes  contributing  to  this  acci- 
dent in  a  greater  or  less  degree.  The  most  important  of  these  was 
the  failure  of  Dispatcher  Stevens  to  issue  a  copy  of  train  order  No. 
104  to  the  operator  at  Georgia,  as  required  by  that  part  of  rule  No. 
208  previously  quoted.  In  his  failure  to  obey  rule  No.  208,  however, 
Dispatcher  Stevens  was  merely  following  a  custom  which  had  pre- 
vailed upon  this  railroad  for  an  indefinite  period. 

Flagman  Bronson  was  to  blame  for  signing  train  order  No.  104  in 
violation  of  rule  No.  210  and  Circular  No.  28.  Having  assumed  the 
duties  of  the  conductor  he  was  also  to  blame  for  not  reading  the  ordei 
to  the  agent  before  signing  it,  for  not  having  the  order  read  to  him 
by  Engineman  Brown  when  he  gave  the  engineman  his  copy  of  the 
order,  for  not  requiring  the  engineman  to  sign  the  conductor's  copy, 
for  not  reading  over  the  order  with  the  conductor,  and  for  not  mak- 
ing himself  familiar  with  the  contents  of  the  order. 

Agent  Boyce  failed  to  obey  rule  No.  210  and  Circular  No.  28  by 
delivering  train  order  No.  104  to  the  flagman  instead  of  to  the  con- 
ductor of  extra  410;  he  was  also  to  blame  for  not  requiring  Flagman 
Bronson  to  read  the  order  to  him  before  signing  it  and  for  not  obey- 
ing that  part  of  rule  No.  221  requiring  operators  to  display  the  stop 
signal  immediately  upon  receipt  of  notification  from  the  dispatcher 
that  there  are  orders  for  a  train. 

Fireman  Kimball,  of  extra  410,  who  was  killed  in  the  collision, 
and  Brakeman  McCarthy,  of  the  same  train,  were  also  open  to  cen- 
sure for  not  making  themselves  familiar  with  the  contents  of  train 
order  No.  104,  as  they  should  have  done  had  they  observed  the  re- 
quirements of  rule  No.  204. 

Engineman  Brown  was  employed  as  such  on  October  10,  1905,  pre- 
vious to  which  he  had  been  an  engineman  for  6  years  on  the  New 


ACCIDENT   ON   CENTRAL  VERMONT   RY.    NEAR  GEORGIA,   VT.  9 

York  Centra]  &  Hudson  River  Railroad.  For  responsibility  in  con- 
nection with  accidents  he  had  been  suspended  for  30  days  on  three 
occasions  and  once  for  5  days.  He  had  also  been  reprimanded  once 
for  the  same  cause.  His  last  suspension  of  30  days  was  on  October 
31,  1913,  but  this  suspension  was  raised  on  November  13.  Flagman 
Bronson  was  employed  in  1900  as  a  brakeman,  and  on  April  2,  1908, 
was  dismissed  for  responsibility  in  connection  with  an  accident.  On 
June  25,  1908,  he  was  reemployed,  his  record  since  that  time  being 
clear  with  the  exception  of  a  suspension  of  5  days  on  December  1. 
L911,  for  rough  switching. 

Conductor  Holland  had  been  with  this  railroad  since  1880,  with 
the  exception  of  a  leave  of  absence  from  1887  to  L889,  as  brakeman 
mid  conductor.  Brakeman  McCarthy  had  been  employed  since  Jan- 
uary 15,  1912;  Fireman  Kimball  since  October  is.  1910;  and  Agent 
Boyce  since  November  17.  1912.  The  records  of  all  four  of  these 
employees  were  clear,  while  none  of  the  employees  involved  in  this 
accident  had  been  employed  in  violation  of  any  of  the  provisions  of 
the  hours  of  service  law. 

The  investigation  of  this  accident  developed  the  fact  that  the 
following  employees  connected  with  these  two  trains  had  not  been 
examined  on  the  operating  rules :  Fireman  Johnson,  of  extra  410. 
who  had  been  in  service  since  April  l;<->.  1911;  Brakeman  McCarthy, 
of  extra  410,  who  had  been  employed  since  January  15,  1912;  and 
Flagman  Denning,  of  extra  777,  who  had  been  employed  since  April 
1,  1913,  about  seven  and  one-half  months,  and  had  been  flagging  for 
about  two  weeks.  Brakeman  Smith,  of  extra  777,  had  only  been 
emploj^ed  since  November  3,  1913.  He  was  given  a  book  of  rules 
and  put  to  work,  no  instructions  of  any  kind  being  given  to  him.  He 
had  not  been  examined  on  the  rules,  neither  had  his  ej^esight  or 
hearing  been  examined. 

From  the  facts  developed  in  the  investigation  of  this  accident  it  is 
manifest  that  the  members  of  the  crew  of  extra  410  violated  the  rules; 
that  they  had  done  so  in  the  past  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  and  that 
the  officials  were  more  or  less  cognizant  of  this  fact.  There  is  no 
excuse  for  the  negligence  in  the  performance  of  their  duties  displayed 
by  these  emplo(yees.  The  officials  of  this  railroad,  however,  are  re- 
sponsible for  their  failure  properly  to  enforce  rule  No.  208  and  for 
the  manner  in  which  other  operating  rules  were  often  disregarded  by 
the  employees.  It  can  not  be  considered  sufficient  merely  to  call  atten- 
tion to  the  fact  that  rules  are  not  being  observed ;  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
officials  to  know  whether  or  not  the  rules  are  observed,  and  if  they 
find  that  they  are  ignored  in  any  way  whatever,  effective  measures 
looking  to  a  remedying  of  the  dangerous  situation  thus  created 
should  be  taken  at  once.  In  this  connection  attention  is  called  to  the 
report  of  the  Commission  covering  the  investigation  of  the  accident 


10  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 

which  occurred  on  the  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Eailroad 
near  North  Haven.  Conn.,  on  September  2,  1913,  wherein  it  was 
stated  that : 

It  is  not  sufficient  for  a  railroad  company  merely  to  provide  signals  and 
rules  to  govern  the  operation  of  trains,  to  issue  bulletins  calling  attention 
to  the  necessity  for  observing  such  signals  and  rules,  and  to  interview  and 
caution  employees  regarding  tbe  observance  of  signals  and  rules.  But  it  is 
an  absolute  duty  of  a  railroad  company  to  know  beyond  question  whether  or 
not  signals  are  obeyed  and  rules  are  rigidly  lived  up  to.  Only  when  this  is 
done  can  a  railroad  company  provide  tbat  measure  of  protection  to  which 
the  traveling  public  is  entitled. 

In  what  manner  or  by  what  specific  authority  the  use  of  the  middle 
order  came  to  be  disregarded  in  cases  where  first-class  trains  were  not 
involved  did  not  definitely  appear;  it  seems  to  have  been  one  of  the 
altogether  too  frequent  cases  of  a  rule  being  disregarded  to  such  an 
extent  that  it  became  a  universal  custom,  no  attention  being  given 
to  the  matter  until  a  disastrous  accident  focused  attention  upon  it. 
The  officials  stated  that  the  middle  order  was  used  in  the  case  of 
first-class  trains  because  of  the  greater  safety  afforded,  and  it  is 
pertinent  to  inquire  why  its  use  would  not  afford  equal  safetj'  in 
the  case  of  other  trains.  In  fact  the  officials  and  employees  agreed 
that  had  the  rule  requiring  the  use  of  the  middle  order  been  fol- 
lowed in  this  case  the  collision  undoubtedly  would  not  have  oc- 
curred. Previous  accident  investigations  have  developed  similar 
situations  of  nonenforcement  of  rules,  for  one  reason  or  another,  and 
in  the  report  covering  the  investigation  of  the  accident  on  the  New 
Haven  road,  above  referred  to,  it  was  stated  that — 

Dereliction  of  duty  by  those  who  are  charged  with  the  making  and  with  the 
enforcement  of  safety  regulations  can  not  fail  to  weaken  respect  for  all  rules 
and  to  render  nugatory  to  a  large  extent  all  efforts  to  maintain  effective  dis- 
cipline. Rules  that  are  not  intended  to  be  enforced  have  no  proper  place  in  a 
railroad  company's  code  of  regulations,  and  when  the  operating  officers  of  a 
railroad  permit  rules  which  have  been  established  to  secure  safety  to  be 
violated  with  impunity  they  can  not  reasonably  expect  to  escape  responsibility 
for  the  consequences  of  such  violations. 

This  statement  applies  with  full  force  to  the  situation  developed  in 
the  investigation  of  this  accident. 

For  the  prevention  of  similar  accidents  it  is  recommended  that  im- 
mediate steps  be  taken  by  the  Central  Vermont  Railway  Company 
looking  to  the  proper  observance  and  enforcement  of  its  operating- 
rules. 

Respectfully  submitted. 

H.  W.  Belnai\ 

Chief  Inspector  of  Safety  Appliances. 

o 


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